According to the FAA’s Contractionspublication, the official code is B773 so ANA1 is encoded correctly. I did notice that ANA2, with the exception of the past couple of weeks, also had B773. It’s possible that someone erroneously entered B77W when he meant to enter B773/W and for some reason it stuck. (The /w indicates the aircraft equipment. 226 Northside Drive SW Atlanta, GA 30313 (404) 254-4494. Hours of Operations. A repaint of the SkySpirit2012 B777-300ER aircraft. Features 32 bit textures, opening doors and cargo doors, dynamic shine and effects, dynamic flexing wings that respond to turbulence, fully independent suspension, trim animation, gear steering, accurate flight dynamics and more. Panel by Philippe Wallaert. Repainted by Mohammed Al-Khalifa.Screenshot of Air India Boeing 777-337ER on runway. Long range high capacity wide-body airliner. In service since 1998. Stretched version of 777-200 as replacement of the 747-100/200. Largest twin engine passenger aircraft in the world.

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BOEING 777-300

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B773

B7739832068

BOEING 777-300

B773 Er

Description

Long range high capacity wide-body airliner. In service since 1998. Stretched version of 777-200 as replacement of the 747-100/200. Largest twin engine passenger aircraft in the world. The 777-300 has a maximum range of 6005 nm11,121,260 m <br />11,121.26 km <br />36,487,073.517 ft <br /> with a MTOW of 299370 kg. The 777-300ER (Extended Range)is capable of flying 7880 nm14,593,760 m <br />14,593.76 km <br />47,879,790.061 ft <br /> with MTOW of 351,534 kg774,999.808 lbs <br />351.534 tonnes <br /> and has a wider wingspan. The B773 is member of the B777 family of aircraft.

Technical Data

Performance Data

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving B773

• B773 / B738 / B738, Melbourne Australia, 2015 (On 5 July 2015, as a Boeing 777-300ER was departing Melbourne, two Boeing 737-800s which were initially on short final for intersecting runways with their ground separation dependent on one receiving a LAHSO clearance, went around. When both approaching aircraft did so, there was a loss of safe terrain clearance, safe separation and wake vortex separation between the three aircraft. The Investigation attributed the event to the actions of an inadequately supervised trainee controller and inappropriate intervention by a supervisory controller. It also identified a systemic safety issue generated by permitting LAHSO at night and a further flaw affecting the risk of all LAHSO at Melbourne.)
• B773, Abu Dhabi UAE, 2016 (On 27 September 2016, the left engine of a Boeing 777-300 failed on takeoff from Abu Dhabi after it ingested debris resulting from tread separation from one of the nose landing gear tyres and a successful overweight return to land then followed. The Investigation found that FOD damage rather than any fault with the manufacture or re-treading of the tyre had initiated tread separation and also noted the absence of any assessment of the risk of engine damage and failure from such debris ingestion which it was noted had the potential to have affected both engines rather than just one.)
• B773, Auckland Airport New Zealand, 2007 (On 22 March 2007, an Emirates Boeing 777-300ER, started its take-off on runway 05 Right at Auckland International Airport bound for Sydney. The pilots misunderstood that the runway length had been reduced during a period of runway works and started their take-off with less engine thrust and flap than were required. During the take-off they saw work vehicles in the distance on the runway and, realising something was amiss, immediately applied full engine thrust and got airborne within the available runway length and cleared the work vehicles by about 28 metres.)
• B773, Dhaka Bangladesh, 2016 (On 7 June 2016, a GE90-115B engined Boeing 777-300 made a high speed rejected takeoff on 3200 metre-long runway 14 at Dhaka after right engine failure was annunciated at 149KCAS - just below V1. Neither crew nor ATC requested a runway inspection and 12 further aircraft movements occurred before it was closed for inspection and recovery of 14 kg of debris. The Investigation found that engine failure had followed Super Absorbent Polymer (SAP) contamination of some of the fuel nozzle valves which caused them to malfunction leading to Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) mechanical damage. The contaminant origin was not identified.)
• B773, Dubai UAE, 2016 (On 3 August 2016 a Boeing 777-300 rejected a landing at Dubai from the runway following a late touchdown after floating in the flare. It then became airborne without either pilot noticing that the A/T had not responded to TO/GA switch selection and without thrust, control was soon lost and the aircraft hit the runway and slid to a stop. The Investigation found that the crew were unfamiliar with the initiation of a go around after touchdown and had failed to follow several required procedures which could have supported early recovery of control and completion of the intended go around.)
• B773, Hong Kong China, 2017 (On 28 April 2017, a Boeing 777-300 made a 3.2g manual landing at Hong Kong, which was not assessed as such by the crew and only discovered during routine flight data analysis, during a Final Line Check flight for a trainee Captain. The Investigation noted that the landing technique used was one of the reasons the Check was failed. The trainee had been an experienced 737 Captain with the operator who had returned from 777 type conversion training with another airline and was required to undertake line training to validate his command status in accordance with local requirements.)
• B773, Lisbon Portugal, 2016 (On 13 January 2016 ice was found on the upper and lower wing surfaces of a Boeing 777-300ER about to depart in the late morning from Lisbon in CAVOK conditions and 10°C. As Lisbon had no de-ice facilities, it was towed to a location where the sun would melt the ice more quickly but during poorly-planned manoeuvring, one of the wingtips was damaged by contact with an obstruction. The Investigation attributed the ice which led to the problematic re-positioning to the operator’s policy of tankering most of the return fuel on the overnight inbound flight where it had become cold-soaked.)
• B773, London Heathrow UK, 2016 (On 30 August 2016, a Boeing 777-300 crew began takeoff from London Heathrow at an intersection one third of the way along the runway using the reduced thrust calculated for a full-length take off instead of the rated thrust calculated for the intersection takeoff. As a result, the aircraft was only just airborne as it crossed the airport boundary and an adjacent public road. The Investigation attributed the data input error to crew failure to respond appropriately on finding that they had provisionally computed performance data based on different assumptions and concluded that the relevant Operator procedures were insufficiently robust.)
• B773, Mauritius, 2018 (On 16 September 2018, a Boeing 777-300 was beginning its takeoff from Mauritius when an inadvertently unsecured cabin service cart left its stowage in the forward galley area and travelled at increasing speed towards the rear of the cabin injuring several passengers before it stopped after meeting an empty seat towards the rear of the cabin. The Investigation noted that cabin crew late awareness of an abnormal aircraft configuration and its consequences had led to them generally prioritising service delivery over safety procedures prior to takeoff with this then leading to an overlooked safety task not being detected.)
• B773, Munich Germany, 2011 (On 3 November 2011, a Boeing 777-300ER crew lost directional control of their aircraft soon after touchdown and after veering off one side of runway 08R, it then crossed to the other side of it before stopping. The Investigation found that during the final stages of an intended autoland in CAT 1 conditions, an ILS LLZ signal disturbance caused by a departing aircraft had led a flight path deviation just before touchdown and, after delaying a pre-briefed automatic go-around until this was inhibited by main gear runway contact, the crew failed to either set thrust manually or disconnect the autopilot.)
• B773, Paris CDG France, 2013 (On 28 July 2013, with passengers still boarding an Air France Boeing 777-300, an abnormal 'burnt' smell was detected by the crew and then thin smoke appeared in the cabin. A MAYDAY was declared and the Captain made a PA telling the cabin crew to 'evacuate the passengers via the doors, only via the doors'. The resulting evacuation process was confused but eventually completed. The Investigation attributed the confused evacuation to the way it had been ordered and established that a fault in the APU had caused the smoke and fumes which had the potential to be toxic.)
• B773, Singapore, 2016 (On 27 June 2016, a Boeing 777-300ER powered by GE90-115B engines returned to Singapore when what was initially identified as a suspected right engine oil quantity indication problem evidenced other abnormal symptoms relating to the same engine. The engine caught fire on landing. The substantial fire was quickly contained and an emergency evacuation was not performed. The cause of the low oil quantity indication and the fire was a failure of the right engine Main Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger which had resulted in lubrication of the whole of the affected engine by a mix of jet fuel and oil.)
• B773, Tokyo Japan, 2016 (On 27 May 2016, a Boeing 777-300 crew made a high speed rejected take off when departing from Tokyo after a number one engine failure warning was quickly followed by a fire warning for the same engine and ATC advice of fire visible. As the fire warning continued with the aircraft stopped, an emergency evacuation was ordered. The Investigation found that the engine failure and fire had occurred when the 1st stage disc of the High Pressure Turbine had suddenly failed as result of undetected fatigue cracking which had propagated from an undetected disc manufacturing fault.)
• B773, en route, northern Turkey, 2014 (On 8 August 2014, the First Officer of a Boeing 777 in the cruise at night at FL340 inadvertently input a change of desired track into the MCP selected altitude window whilst acting as both PF and PM during controlled rest by the aircraft commander. The aircraft then descended for nearly 2 minutes without her awareness until ATC queried the descent and it was arrested at FL317.)
• B773, en-route, Bay of Bengal, 2011 (On 18 October 2011, an Etihad Boeing 777-300 encountered severe turbulence westbound over the Bay of Bengal because of a late track deviation whilst the aircraft commander was briefly absent from the flight deck. Two occupants, one a member of the cabin crew and the other a passenger, sustained severe injuries and 12 other occupants sustained minor injuries. The subsequent Investigation noted that the severe weather encountered was evident well in advance and could have been avoided. The low level of experience in role and on aircraft type of the operating crew was noted.)
• B773, en-route, Bering Sea, 2013 (On 2 July 2013, a Korean Air Lines Boeing 777-300 experienced an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of one of its GE90-115B engines while crossing the Bering Sea. The crew made an uneventful diversion to Anadyr Russia. The Korean Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB) delegated investigative duties of this event to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which identified the cause of the failure as a manufacturing process deficiency which could affect nearly 200 similar engines.)
• B773, en-route, South China Sea Vietnam 2011 (On 17 October 2011, a Singapore Airlines Boeing 777-300 in the cruise at night with a Training Captain in command made what turned out to be an insufficient deviation around a potential source of turbulence and, with the seat belt signs remaining off, a number of cabin crew and passenger injuries were sustained during sudden brief but severe turbulence encounter. The Operator subsequently introduced enhanced pilot training to support more effective weather avoidance and better use of the various types of weather radar fitted to aircraft in their 777 fleet.)
• B773, en-route, east northeast of Anchorage AK USA, 2015 (On 30 December 2015, a Boeing 777-300 making an eastbound Pacific crossing en-route to Toronto encountered forecast moderate to severe clear air turbulence associated with a jet stream over mountainous terrain. Some passengers remained unsecured and were injured, one seriously and the flight diverted to Calgary. The Investigation found that crew action had mitigated the injury risk but that more could have been achieved. It was also found that the pilots had not been in possession of all relevant information and that failure of part of the air conditioning system during the turbulence was due to an improperly installed clamp.)
• B773, en-route, near Kurihara Japan, 2018 (On 24 June 2018, a Boeing 777-300 was briefly subjected to unexpected and severe Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) whilst level at FL300 which resulted in a serious injury to one of the cabin crew as they cleared up after in-flight service. The Investigation concluded that the turbulence had occurred because of the proximity of the aircraft to a strong jet stream and that the forecast available at pre-flight briefing had underestimated the strength of the associated vertical wind shear.)
• B773, en-route, north northwest of Adelaide Australia, 2017 (On 14 October 2017, a Boeing 777-300ER en route to Sydney declared a MAYDAY and diverted to Adelaide after the annunciation of a lower deck hold fire warning and the concurrent detection of a burning smell in the flight deck. The remainder of the flight was completed without further event and after landing a precautionary rapid disembarkation was performed. The Investigation found that the fire risk had been removed by the prescribed crew response to the warning and that the burning which had occurred had been caused by chafing of a wiring loom misrouted at build.)
• B773, vicinity Houston TX USA, 2014 (On 3 July 2014, a Boeing 777-300 departing Houston came within 200 feet vertically and 0.61nm laterally of another aircraft after climbing significantly above the Standard Instrument Departure Procedure (SID) stop altitude of 4,000 feet believing clearance was to FL310. The crew responded to ATC avoiding action to descend and then disregarded TCAS 'CLIMB' and subsequently LEVEL OFF RAs which followed. The Investigation found that an inadequate departure brief, inadequate monitoring by the augmented crew and poor communication with ATC had preceded the SID non-compliance and that the crew should have followed the TCAS RAs issued.)
• B773, vicinity Melbourne Australia, 2011 (On 24 July 2011, a Thai Airways International Boeing 777-300 descended below the safe altitude on a night non-precision approach being flown at Melbourne and then failed to commence the go around instructed by ATC because of this until the instruction had been repeated. The Investigation concluded that the aircraft commander monitoring the automatic approach flown by the First Officer had probably experienced ‘automation surprise’ in respect of the effects of an unexpected FMS mode change and had thereafter failed to monitor the descent of the aircraft with a selected FMS mode which was not normally used for approach.)
• B789 / B773, Delhi India, 2017 (On 7 October 2017, an arriving Boeing 787-9 and a departing Boeing 777-300 lost separation during intended use of runway 29 at Delhi when the 787-9 commenced a go around from overhead the runway because the departing 777-300 was still on the runway and came within 0.2 nm laterally and 200 feet vertically after ATC had failed to ensure that separation appropriate to mixed mode use was applied using speed control. The conflict was attributed to failure of the TWR controller to adhere to prevailing standard operating procedures.)
• Vehicle / B773, Singapore, 2013 (On 3 October 2013, a vehicle entered an active runway without clearance after partial readback of a potentially confusing clearance was not challenged by the controller. A different controller then cleared a Boeing 777-300 to land without taking all available action to ensure that the runway was clear. The aircraft crew saw the vehicle near the edge of the runway after touchdown and manoeuvred their aircraft away from it, although the aircraft wing still passed over it. At the time of the incident, vehicles with clearance were permitted to cross red stop bars, a policy which has since been changed.)